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NOTES
COMPETITION IN GASOLINE RETAILING: A PRICE WAR
The price war in gasoline retailing is not an innovation; however, the
increase in the number of automobile owners, the growth of strong retail
dealer associations, and the recent nationwide recurrence of gasoline price
wars in metropolitan areas have served to arouse a greater public interest in
this phenomenon. The purpose of this Note is to consider the economic and
social causes of a particular, and presumably typical, gasoline price war in
the Philadelphia-Camden area; the legal consequences involved in initiation,
aggravation and termination of the price war; and methods used to prevent
future price wars, including the desirability of legislation directed toward
that end.
A CASE STUDY 1
In 1949 a Philadelphia retail dealer - (A) of Esso gasoline was com-
peting with other dealers in the same and other branded 8 gasolines. The
price of regular 4 gasoline for all brands in the area remained relatively
constant at 26.9 cents a gallon. To compete for customers, A endeavored
to make his station as attractive as possible; he also furnished extra services
cheerfully, and offered "specials" on accessories. He and the other dealers
were operating at what they considered to be a "fair" margin, usually ex-
plained in terms of overhead costs and family living expenses. At the time,
this margin amounted to 5.2 cents a gallon, which was generally considered
"fair."
Early in 1950 a modern multi-pump station was constructed in the
neighborhood by Saveway, a retailing chain that vended non-branded 5
gasoline. The Saveway station provided none of the free tire, battery, and
windshield services offered by the Esso dealer, but began selling its gasoline
1. This case study is based upon interviews with representative dealers and re-
finers in the Philadelphia-Camden area.
2. The retail level of the industry is characterized by three types of service
stations where branded gasoline is being sold:
(a) Employee-operated-where the retailer is employed by the supplier who
owns and operates the station.
(b) Lessee-operated-where the retailer is a lessee of the supplier, paying a flat
rental for the station and/or a graduated rental based on gallonage.
(c) Owner-operated-where the retailer owns the station and contracts with
the supplier for his products.
3. A "branded dealer" retails gasoline under the brand name of his supplier.
4. This Note is concerned only with the price of regular gasoline as opposed
to hi-test which sells for more and has a higher octane rating.
5. A "non-branded dealer" does not market his gasoline under the brand name
of his supplier.
(644)
COMPETITION IN GASOLINE RETAILING
at 22.9 cents a gallon. The Esso dealer along with other dealers in ad-
vertised brands soon learned that large numbers of their former customers
were more interested in price than in brand, especially since car per-
formance indicated that the new station was not selling inferior quality
gasoline. Apparently, the public also had little interest in the extra serv-
ices furnished by the branded dealers, when they realized that these services
were reflected in a price differential of four cents a gallon.
With their gallonage 6 decreasing rapidly, as much as 50% in several
reported instances, the dealers and suppliers 7 of branded gasoline in the
area began to take steps to meet the new price competition. Sun Oil Com-
pany, for instance, sent salesmen to its neighboring outlets advising the
dealers to cut their price to 24.9 cents a gallon. The Sun management
believed that a branded gasoline could effectively compete with a non-
branded gasoline which sold for only one to two cents less. Sun dealers
adopted their supplier's suggestion, and soon other branded dealers, in-
cluding the Esso dealer, were cutting their prices to this level.
A neighboring Esso dealer (B) had recently converted his station into
a modern multi-pump emporium complete with all extra services. He
very quickly felt the effect of the 22.9 cents price of his new competitor.
To save his business investment B decided he would have to meet Saveway
at its own price. Counting on the greater consumer response to branded
gasoline, he conspicuously displayed his reduced price by placing a large
sign in front of his station. Simultaneously he eliminated services, includ-
ing repairs,8 requiring skilled, higher paid employees, and thereby trans-
formed his business into a gas pumping enterprise which could be handled
by cheap labor. His gallonage consequently increased tenfold to the point
that gasoline was being dispensed almost as rapidly as Esso could supply
it. Although his margin was only 1.2 cents a gallon above Esso's tank-
wagon price 9 of 21.7 cents, B was making about three times as much as
before the "war."
Dealer B's competitive response to the appearance of Saveway dimin-
ished Dealer A's gallonage even further. A and other affected Esso outlets
grudgingly reduced their prices to 23.9 cents, still one cent above B's (and
Saveway's) price; however, unable to match B's low overhead, they con-
tinued to suffer losses. They complained vigorously to the Esso Sales office
about B's underpricing. Under pressure of the complaints, Esso's district
sales manager attempted to persuade B to raise his price. The district
6. The gallonage of the average retailer in this area is ten to twelve thousand
gallons a month.
7. The term "supplier" in this note refers to the refiner of crude oil. In the Phil-
adelphia and Camden areas the great bulk of the gasoline supplied to retail outlets
is distributed by the refiner.
8. New engineering advances in automobile manufacturing have resulted in fewer
service requirements.
9. The "tank-wagon price" is the price paid by the retail dealer. Normally,
the tank-wagon price is the same for all branded gasoline, regardless of the supplier
and the method of distribution to the retail outlet. See discussion of "price leader-
ship," infra.
19531
646 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
manager pointed out that Saveway handled an inferior gasoline and B could
charge a higher price and still be competitive. B countered that it
was an open secret in the industry that a large branded gasoline company
or companies were supplying Saveway under a contract providing for a
price substantially less than that paid by the branded outlets. He rein-
forced his argument by illustrating that the Saveway advertisements were
couched in such terms as to indicate that Saveway gasoline was just as good
as any regular branded gasoline. It became apparent to the district man-
ager that B, who had of late become a successful entrepreneur, was in no
negotiating mood. With a few well chosen words to indicate that such
matters of cooperation were considered when the time for renewal of con-
tracts for gasoline and oil came around, the district manager left the busy
premises.
Sun Oil reacted to similar dealer complaints by granting to its outlets
in areas it deemed critically affected temporary competitive allowances in
the form of guaranteed margins of 3.5 cents a gallon. Other suppliers
adopted similar subsidizing practices, including reduction of tank wagon
price and/or rent to affected dealers, so that branded dealers were able to
bring and keep their retail prices within one cent of Saveway's ever
plummeting price which reached a nadir of 13.9 cents by fall of 1950. All
the while dealer B, who was now buttressed by Esso's allowance, had met
each Saveway cut with an identical price cut.
In addition to complaining to their suppliers, the branded dealers
combined among themselves in an attempt to forestall the price war, largely
by appealing for remedial legislation. In Philadelphia, they succeeded in
having an ordinance adopted by the City Council '0 limiting the size of
signs at the stations advertising the price of gasoline. However, late in
1950 a dissenting group of dealers, led by B, contested the constitutionality
of the ordinance, as a result of which its enforcement was stayed.'1 In
adjoining Camden, where a price war had started soon after Saveway
established another station' there, the dealers' association caused the
Governor of New Jersey to appoint a special investigating committee.'
2
The New Jersey dealers also allowed themselves to be organized by the
Teamsters' union.13 The purpose of this affiliation was apparently to obtain
the cooperation of the teamsters in an effort to cut off the supply of gasoline
to price-cutters. In the summer of 1951 those stations which displayed signs
advertising cut prices were picketed by dealers carrying signs bearing the
words "Unfair to Organized Labor." Motorists refused to respect the picket
lines, however, and because of threatened legal action by the Sun Oil
10. Journal of City Council of Philadelphia, Appendix § 273, Oct. 5, 1950.
11. Subsequently the ordinance was held constitutional. Mark Robbins v. City
of Philadelphia, Pa. C.P. 6, March 1, 1951. However, operation of this ordinance
has been stayed pending an appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
12. See REP., GASOLINE STUDY COMM. OF N.J. (1951).
13. United Service Station Operators' and Employees' Union organized by the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers,
Local No. 676, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor.
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Company the picket lines were removed. 14  Eventually the New Jersey
legislature passed a statute limiting the size of gasoline price signs which
remains uncontested.15
Prices had unevenly crept upward from the low point reached in the
fall of 1950, partly because of gradually decreasing subsidies by suppliers
and partly because of dealer agreements aimed at raising prices. Late in
February of 1952, when the competitive allowance amounted to approxi-
mately 3 to 4 cents a gallon, all the suppliers discontinued the subsidy prac-
tice within a few days of each other. Tank-wagon prices returned to and
have since remained at the pre-price-war level of 21.7 cents a gallon in
Philadelphia and 19.6 cents in Camden (the New Jersey tax being two
cents below Pennsylvania's). 6 In Camden, because of the New Jersey
statute, "circus" signs have been removed by the dealers and placed in the
back rooms of stations in apparent readiness for the next fight for gallonage.
Many dealers at first decided to charge 25.4 cents (OPS ceiling at that
time) because there was now no fear of a price-cutter catching the eye of a
price-conscious motorist. However, since Saveway has continued to charge
22.9 cents, many Sun dealers have refused to go higher than 24.9 cents.
Accordingly, all branded dealers felt compelled to bring their prices down
0.5 cents, from the 25.4 cent level, in order to meet competition. The price
to the consumer in the Camden area has remained stable at this point.
In Philadelphia, the price war has continued in certain sections. With
the sign ordinance enjoined, signs inviting motorists to take advantage of
lower prices are still displayed. The average price of branded gasoline
in affected areas is 23.9 cents. Saveway and B, who is now selling Rich-
field gasoline, apparently as a result of his failure to raise prices at the
further request of the Esso district manager, are charging 22.9 cents. How-
ever, where the influence of Saveway and price-cutters is not felt as keenly,
the public is paying from 26.9 to 28.9 cents per gallon for gasoline. This
perplexing situation has once again had state-wide ramifications. As late
as August, 1952, factions of retail dealers appealed to the Governor for a
probe of the retail gasoline business in Pennsylvania. The findings were
to be utilized to formulate future legislation. 17 It was suggested that the
intense price competition had forced many "honest" dealers to carry on
14. At present many dealers still are dues-paying members of the labor organiza-
tion.
15. NJ. STAT. ANi. 56:6-2.2 (Supp. 1952), which became effective May 22,
1952. The statute provides that the price sign may not exceed 8 x 10 inches and
must be on the pump only.
16. Dwight T. Colley, Vice-President of Atlantic Refining Co., in an address
to the Pennsylvania Petroleum Association urged major suppliers not to indulge
in practices which promote gasoline price wars and keep them going at the retail
level. Gasoline Retailer, May 21, 1952, p. 9, col. 1.
17. "We are convinced that the Commonwealth should take matters into its own
hands as far as the gasoline retailers in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania are
concerned." Petition of Gasoline Retailers Association presented to the Governor
of Pennsylvania by Gerald W. Ulman, General Counsel. Philadelphia Inquirer,
August 12, 1952, p. 7, col. 5. Query whether this would include a special commis-
sion to be set up for the purpose of controlling entrance into gasoline retailing as
well as regulating methods of competition.
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fraudulent practices in retailing their gasoline, and that this would con-
tinue so long as a few men insisted on making gasoline retailing a "pump-




Members of the industry suggest that Saveway is supplied under a
long-term contract by a major supplier which also supplies its own branded
outlets in this area. Is a differential in price granted by such a supplier
between these two outlets a prohibited discrimination within the meaning
of the Robinson-Patman Act? It has been said that when the national
brand is removed, the difference in price is not discriminatory since a
different and inferior product in the economic sense is being sold.'" How-
ever, the Act makes no such exception. The Act makes it ". . . unlaw-
ful . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such dis-
crimination may be substantially to lessen competition . . . or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who . . . knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination. . . . " 2 If the gasoline sup-
plied to the branded and non-branded dealers is of "like grade and quality,"
any discrimination in price puts the burden of showing justification, to
rebut the prima facie case thus made, upon the person charged with the
violation.21 The Act provides that nothing contained therein ". . . shall
prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the
cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods
or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or
delivered." 22 In selling n6n-branded gasoline to a single purchaser, the
18. Contrary to the picture as painted above, some dealers think that price wars
are instigated by a major supplier persuading its retail outlets to decrease their
prices. This would temporarily serve to increase the gallonage of both retailer and
supplier and to relieve storage problems of the supplier which finds itself in possession
of more refined product than its existing storage facilities will hold. However, such
a theory was found, during this study, to have no basis in fact in the Philadelphia-
Camden area. It also seems theoretically unsound because the industry must realize
that the benefit which would accrue to the supplier initiating such a price war would
be only temporary. In the long run, profits would decline, since it is doubtful
that consumer purchase of gasoline increases substantially during a price war, but
it is definite that cost to the consumer declines. Furthermore, the accuracy of the
individual suppliers in allocating production makes such a theory even more suspect.
19. Dirlam and Kahn, Leadership and Conflict in the Pricing of Gasoline, 61
YAim L.J. 818, 833 nA8 (1952).
20. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946).
21. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148, 378 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Cf. FTC v. Morton
Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948), where the Court first states (at 44) that a discrimina-
tion in price violated the Act if it had the defined effect on competition and then
(at 50) declares it to be "self evident" that competition may be adversely affected
when a producer sells his goods to some customers at a price substantially less
than to competitors' of such customers. See FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324
U.S. 746, 760 (1945) ; Ruberoid Co. v. FTC, 189 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1951).
22. See note 20 supra.
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supplier usually will realize substantial savings in selling and distribution
costs which can be reflected in the price sold. For example, none of the
supplier's costs of advertising his own brands will be allocable to non-
branded gasoline. But whether the differential is such as to make only
"due allowance" requires the consideration of facts not now available.
Even if the gasoline supplied to the non-brand dealers is not of "like grade
and quality" with that supplied to the brand dealers, but is competitive with
it, and sold for the purpose of eliminating competition, at a price so low as
to be disproportionate to the difference in quality, there may be an unfair
method of competition prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act.23
Aggravation
Some dealers faced with financial losses and possibility of insolvency
because of the price war appeal to their suppliers for relief, as A did in
the case study. The supplier's decision as to whether to grant or withhold
a price concession to a particular dealer is complicated by conflicts in its
interests. While wishing to relieve its outlet, it still desires to inhibit the
spread of the price war. The usual supplier solution is to designate a
specific territory as a "critical area" in which a uniform competitive al-
lowance in the wholesale price of gasoline is made to dealers. Two reported
instances have pointed up the arbitrary character of this solution. In one
case X owned a station on a main highway just outside the city limits of
Philadelphia. Y, who sold the same product, owned a similar station on the
same highway just inside the city line. Their supplier considered the city
line as the boundary of the "critical area" and gave an allowance only to
those within the city. In this instance X could not successfully compete
with Y. In another case Z owned a station on a main thoroughfare which
fell within the "critical area" as drawn by his supplier. Price wars
flourished on adjoining streets, but no competing station was located on Z's
thoroughfare for some distance on either side of his station. As a result
Z felt little competitive pressure to lower his price, so that the supplier's
concession to increased competition in the area was not passed on to Z's
customers.
Such discrimination by a supplier engaged in interstate commerce is a
prima facie violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.2 4 However, a supplier
may justify this practice by showing that its lower price to any purchaser
"was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor." 2
It must prove the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and
prudent person to believe that the granting of a lower price would in fact
meet the equally low price of a competitor 26 Such lower price must not
undercut the competitor's price,27 and if the competitor's goods normally
23. See AUSTIN, PRicE DiSCRImiNATION 40 (1952).
24. See note 21 supra.
25. See note 20 supra.
26. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
27. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 379 (2d Cir. 1945).
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sell at a lower price (as in the case of lower grade or unadvertised brands)
a mere meeting of such price may be held to be lacking in "good faith"
since meeting such a price is unnecessary to meet the competition.28  Per-
haps it must prove that its lower price was not made for the purpose of
eliminating or injuring a competitor.29  Is this process of designating
"critical areas" as illustrated by the above examples a "good faith" meeting
of competition? The primary remedial objective of the Act is to suppress
discriminations, between customers of the same seller, not supported by
sound economic differences in their business positions or in the cost of
serving them.8 0 The Act thus places emphasis on individual competitive
situations.31 Therefore, although the dealer allowances are ordinarily
temporary 32 and the supplier has an economic stake in halting the price
war, a practice of drawing arbitrary lines to separate those in the affected
area probably would not meet the requirement of a "good faith" meeting
of competition. However, it would seem that the supplier should have
some reasonable measure of discretion in determining exactly what are the
boundaries of the "critical area," and if he can demonstrate his good faith
in this determination, he should not be held to have violated the Act.
It is interesting to note that since March 1952, no competitive allow-
ance has been openly granted to dealers in the Philadelphia-Camden area.
Although the price war had substantially abated by then, this policy deci-
sion on the part of suppliers also might be due to the Robinson-Patman
implications discussed above.
Termination by Dealer Control
Trade Association Activities.-Recent years have witnessed the organ-
ization of dealers into associations to promote their mutual interests. Mem-
bership in these organizations increases during a price war and decreases
during periods of stable prices. One of the main purposes of these organ-
izations is to keep the retail prices of gasoline stable.n Methods to effec-
tuate this goal include appeals to the legislature and agreements among the
members not to engage in price cutting activities.34 Even though this is a
28. Porto Rican Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.
1929).
29. See AusriN, PRicE DiscRImINAnoN 97 (1952).
30. H.R. Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
31. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 725 (1948).
32. Cf. Ibid., where the Court said that the good faith meeting of competition
proviso did not permit a seller to use a sales system which constantly resulted in his
getting more money for like goods from some customers than from others.
33. James V. Cresente, President of the Cleveland Independent Dealers Associa-
tion, concluded a report on a survey of service stations as follows: "Do like other
small businessmen have done. When they found that they were working too long
for too little, they banded together and formed a businessmen's association. They
solved their own problems by maintaining regular business hours and establishing
a profitable mark-up for their wares." Gasoline Retailer, June 18, 1952, p. 9, col. 1.
34. See The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Feb. 27, 1953, p. 3, col. 4, where
a dealer admits that such agreements have been made. For another type of price
agreement, see note 69, infra.
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local association, such agreements establishing margins would probably be
a violation of the Sherman Act.3 5 The primary purpose of stabilizing the
price of gasoline in the market area, i.e., the city and suburban areas in
the case study, makes the agreement illegal per se whether or not the
parties to the agreement have the power, through substantial market
control,3 6 to effectuate that purpose.3
7
On several occasions dealers have been known to form small cliques
and attempt to stop price-cutting activities by directly coercing the price-
cutter through threats and intimidation, or by indirectly exerting pressure
on him through annoying practices of doubtful legality. For example,
"motorists" have driven their cars into price-cutting stations at the peak
of the business day and, after ordering one gallon of gasoline, tendered
large bills in payment. Traffic jams produced by the ensuing delay soon
discouraged many waiting drivers who moved on to other stations. At-
tempts have also been made by dealers to purchase all the price-cutter's
gasoline at the low price. Such competitive practices may be tortious, and
injunctive relief and/or damages might be obtained under applicable state
law.
8
Labor Union Activity.-In the case study the Camden dealers' associa-
tion took the form of a "union" whose members were predominantly owners
and lessees of stations, as well as some employees. There was no sem-
blance of a collective bargaining purpose and no employer with whom to
bargain; yet apparently the group considered itself a "labor union." It
engaged in organized picketing of dealers who displayed signs advertising
lower prices. The announced purpose of the picketing was organizational:
to force price-cutting dealers to join the union, whose rules proscribed such
signs. But, as indicated above, the ultimate purpose of the organization was
to stabilize gasoline prices in the area.
Such a union should not qualify for the rights of a "labor organization"
under the National Labor Relations Act, 9 which contemplates an organiza-
tion of employees existing for the purpose of bargaining with employers
concerning grievances, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or condi-
35. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946). Where local association ac-
tivity is scrutinized, it is questionable whether the interstate commerce requirement is
met; however, in view of the interstate character of gasoline distribution any price
agreement at the retail level as to gasoline would probably be held to affect the flow
of commerce. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219 (1948); United States v. Gimbel Bros., CCH '48-'51 TRADE REG.
Smv. 61,244 (1950). But cf. Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408, 415 (D.
Conn. 1950) where the court said: "An agreement to maintain existing gasoline
retail prices entered into by retailers of gasoline in the Meriden area, is an agree-
ment not in interstate commerce, but is in violation of the common law of Connecti-
cut."
36. Cf. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
37. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). But cf.
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
38. See PROSsER, ToRTs, § 105 (1941), and cases cited therein.
39. 49 STAT. 4491 (1925), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1946), as amended, 61 STAT.
1361 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §141 et seq. (Supp. 1949).
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tions of work.40  Protection under the Act has been extended in several
instances to persons traditionally considered entrepreneurs where they have
been affected by the mischief aimed at by the Act.41  Included have been
taxi drivers,42 red-cap porters,4 seamstresses, 44 insurance canvassers 45 and
newsboys.4 6 Since labor is not a commodity in interstate commerce be-
cause of § 6 of the Clayton Act,4 7 an ancillary effect of allowing such groups
to organize has been to exclude them from prosecution for monopolization
under the Sherman Act. The exemption, at first construed very narrowly,
was extended by the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 48 by curtailing
drastically the equity jurisdiction of federal courts in the field of labor
disputes even where a violation of the Sherman Act is alleged because of
concerted action on the part of the union.49  The purpose of exempting
labor groups from the anti-trust laws was to allow people in inferior bar-
gaining positions, because of their lack of resources as compared with em-
ployers, to organize and act without fear of violating the law.49 a It would
appear, therefore, that the aforementioned "independent contractors"-
newsboys, porters, etc.-should be allowed such power since such groups
are in an inferior bargaining position in regard to the buyers of their labor.
However, in two recent pronouncements courts seem to have lost sight of
this underlying policy; ruling that the exemption will not apply unless an
employer-employee relationship is the matrix of the controversy, 50 and
further, that a dispute as to the price of a commodity does not fall within
the scope of the exempting acts.51 Under these decisions, the "union" of
retail gasoline dealers which attempted to stabilize prices would certainly
not be protected from injunction by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, or the state
counterparts thereof,52 since there was no employment situation in-
40. The 'term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or
any agency or employee representative committee or plan, in which employees par-
ticipate and which exists for this purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of em-
ployment, or conditions of work. 61 STAT. 138 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §152 (5) (Supp.
1949).
41. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
42. Taxi-Cab Drivers Local Union No. 899 v. Yellow Cab Operating Co., 123
F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1941).
43. Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386 (1942).
44. United States v. Vogue, 145 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1945).
45. La Lone v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 947 (D. Wash. 1944).
46. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
47. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §17 (1946).
48. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1946).
49. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 U.S. 91
(1940) ; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
49a. See Gottesman, Restraint of Trade-Employees or Enterprisers? 15 U.
oF CHI. L. Rv. 638 (1948).
50. Columbia River Packers Assoc. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942); Ring v.
Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945).
51. Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd. v. International Longshoremen's Union, 72
F. Supp. 562 (D. Hawaii 1947) (alternative holding).
52. Such statutes were patterned after the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act. See,
e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:29-77.1 et seq. (Supp. 1951).
The state statutes differ from the Norris-LaGuardia Act which expressly pro-
vides that the employer-employee relationship need not exist between the disputants.
47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §113(c) (1946). The following language is usually
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volved. Furthermore, the fact that the retailers were not organizing with
the object of equalizing their bargaining position as to those with whom
they deal-in this situation the general public-would indicate that they
should be given no protection under statutes benefiting labor. Here we
have bargaining in its simplest form-retailers dealing at arms length with
the public. Each group may buy or sell as it wishes and there is no com-
pelling argument that either one has an inferior bargaining position. The
organization of retailers, with the concomitant result of price-fixing, would
indeed upset that equilibrium of bargaining power and should be con-
demned both doctrinally and policywise.
Constitutional protection of peaceful picketing 53 would probably be
no obstacle to the party seeking an injunction in a state court since state
policy against the purpose for which the picketing is being carried on,
legislatively or judicially declared, would be sufficient to overcome con-
stitutional objections.5"
Termination by Supplier Control
The retailer's situation in the gasoline industry is different from that
of the average merchant. His whole business is built around pumps and
tanks which can be used only for his supplier's gasoline. 55 In many cases
he is a lessee who pays rent to the supplier. It would be unrealistic to
call him completely independent.56 As a practical matter he cannot try
Atlantic one month and Gulf the next. He is told to associate himself with
the product he sells. Above all he is told that friendly service, attractive
stations,5 7 sanitary rest rooms, and good locations are the competitive
weapons to emphasize.
found in state court decisions construing their anti-injunction acts. "The act is
bottomed in the employer and employee relationship, . . . and the phrase 'labor
dispute' as defined and used in the act necessarily must be founded upon or proxi-
mately grow out of a basic relationship of employer and employee and a dispute
concerning terms or conditions of employment." Outdoor Sports Corp. v. Local
23132, A.F. of L., 6 N.J. 217, 227, 78 A.2d 69, 74 (1951).
53. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
54. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (antitrust
legislative policy); Building Service Employees International Union, Local 262 v.
Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (public policy of state as announced by legislature
in regard to state labor legislation) ; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local
309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) (judicially announced policy of "rugged indi-
vidualism").
55. This practice was held not to be a violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act, 38
STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1946), which outlaws tying clauses "where the
effect may be to substantially lessen competition." FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
261 U.S. 463 (1923).
56. Although the dealer claims that he can get batteries, tires and accessories
from anyone, it is usually from someone whom the supplier suggests. The retailer
rationalizes this practice by saying that it is good business to deal with a dependable
firm, and suppliers will usually recommend a reliable outfit. Such conduct is question-
able in the light of recent decisions. See Standard Oil of California v. United States,
337 U.S. 293 (1949) ; United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.
Cal. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 922 (1952). The government is now in the process of
litigating these arrangements. See United States v. Sun Oil Co., Civil No. 10483,
E.D. Pa., Jan. 12, 1950.
57. For an entertaining description of the increase in the number of attractive
service stations see an excerpt from an address delivered by Harold L. Ickes, when
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During a price war many retailers who have been emphasizing service
continue to do so. Under such conditions they cannot hope to run their
stations as economically as the price-cutter. Rather than advocate that
non-price-cutters stop emphasizing service, some suppliers attempt to
influence the price-cutter to restore his price to "normal." 58 If such
pressure is successful, the price war will come to a speedy end and many
of the supplier's outlets will be relieved. Since it is the seller's prerogative
to stipulate his conditions of sale, such persuasion, including cutting off an
uncooperative retailer, does not constitute a violation of the antitrust
laws. 59 But, in view of the interstate character of gasoline distribution,
an agreement between a dealer and a supplier as to the retail price to be
charged in the sale of gasoline already sold to the dealer might violate the
Sherman Act.60 However, the Miller-Tydings amendment 6 1 does permit
a supplier, as an incident of his contract of sale, to indicate concurrently
the resale price in a state which has enacted fair trade legislation.6 2 This
has not been done in the Philadelphia-Camden area.
Where supplier influence fails, the supplier begins to make competitive
allowances. As the price war continues, the supplier's gallonage soon ap-
proximates that of before the "war," but at diminished profits, or even
losses.0 3 To regain his former profit position the supplier's obvious first
step would appear to be withdrawal of the competitive allowances; but
unless other suppliers were to do the same, such a course of action would
only place his dealers at the same competitive disadvantage as before. Yet
the allowances were withdrawn in the case study0 4 The fact is that all the
suppliers decided to stop subsidizing their retailers at the same time. Con-
scious collusion among suppliers is not necessary to obtain this result. The
explanation lies rather in a deep-rooted characteristic of the gasoline in-
dustry-price leadership. 65
he was Secretary of the Interior, before the American Petroleum Institute in
Dallas, Texas, on November 14, 1934, reprinted in TNEC Monograph 39A, 94-95
(1941).
58. "Normal" as used here means the price which was being charged before the
price cutting began.
59. United States v. Colgate and Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). For possible viola-
tions of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, see FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing
Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
60. Cf. Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
61. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §1 (Supp. 1951).
62. In addition the supplier itself can sometimes "hold the dike" by maintaining
the price at a company-owned station located on the perimeter of the affected area.
63. Although cheaper gasoline might encourage people to use their cars more,
it is not believed that this will cause any great increase in over-all consumption.
64. Removal of subsidies by suppliers will not stop the price war. However, it
will lessen the severity of the war.
65. For an excellent economic study of price leadership in the gasoline industry
see Dirlam and Kahn, Leadership and Conflict in the Pricing of Gasoline, 61 YALE
LJ. 818 (1952). See also Learned, Pricing of Gasolime: A Case Study, 26 HARV.
Bus. REv. 723 (1948); LYNcH, TnE CONcENTRATION oF Ecoxomc Pow a 174
(1946).
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In "normal" times the tank wagon price in the gasoline industry re-
mains stable through a system of price leadership. A single marketer,
usually the largest in a given area, quotes a price for his product which is
usually followed by other marketers in the area.66 No agreement or under-
standing 67 is necessary. The suppliers justify this practice 68 by reasoning
that since the price leader is studying conditions of supply and demand it
will know when the time is ripe for a price change. The fact that some-
times the leader is not followed in a price rise would indicate that this is a
flexible practice and that other suppliers are also studying economic condi-
tions attendant to determining prices. Inevitably a leader is followed down
because it has the largest number of outlets in the area, and failure to drop
price would undoubtedly cause a tremendous loss of gallonage.6 9
66. "Thus the leader almost always is one of the great integrated companies and
more often than not a member of the original Standard Oil group. Table 18 lists
the market leaders for various areas in 1939.
"TABLE 18. MAIRi.T LEADERSHIP IN THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY, 1939.
Area Price Leader
New York and New England Socony-Vacuum Oil Corp.
Pennsylvania and Delaware Atlantic Refining Co.
New Jersey, Maryland, Dist. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey
of Columbia, Virginia, North
Carolina and South Carolina
Ohio Standard Oil Co. of Ohio
Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky
Georgia and Florida
Tennessee, Louisiana and Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana
Arkansas
Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, Standard Oil of Indiana
Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska,
Kansas and Minnesota
Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Continental Oil Co.
Mexico, Idaho and Utah
Washington, Oregon, California, Standard Oil Co. of California
Nevada and Arizona
Oklahoma Magnolia (susbsidiary of
Socony)
Texas Magnolia or Texas Corp.
Source: Hearings before thw Temporary Natioml Economic Committee,
Part 16, 8880-8881.' LYNcHi, op. cit. supra note 65, at 177.
67. "The fixing of prices by one member of a group pursuant to express dele-
gation, acquiescence, or understanding is just as illegal as the fixing of prices by
direct joint action." U.S. v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942).
68. The practice was explained before the TNEC by Mr. Sidney A. Swensrud,
Vice President of the Standard Oil Co. of Ohio. See CooK, CONTROL OF THE
PET oLEuM INDUSTRY 47-49 (TNEC Monograph 39, 1941).
69. An ancillary type of price leadership occurs in setting the service station
(retail) price where the supplier-owned-and-operated stations set a price which is
usually followed in the area by independent retailers of the same brand. Such a
price leader can also come from the ranks of the owner or lessee retailers. In the
past, associations have been advised by their executives to engage in a system of price
leadership. TNEC Hearings, Part 16, 9040-9045 (1940).
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Since price leadership 7 o deals with a national economic concentration
of power against which the antitrust laws may or may not be aimed,71 it
relates to too broad a topic for this Note, which deals with a local economic
problem-a price war.7 2  However, one aspect of price leadership will be
treated at this point: the uniformity with which competitive allowances
were withdrawn in the price war under consideration. 73 Although it is un-
70. Price leadership in itself has never been condemned by the courts as a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. In at least two cases price leadership was introduced as
evidence of the existence of a monopoly and in both cases the fact of the leadership
was considered insignificant. See United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417
(1920) and United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927). "And
the fact that competitors may see proper, in the exercise of their own judgment,
to follow the prices of another manufacturer, does not establish any suppression of
competition or show any sinister domination. [Citing U.S. Steel Case]" United
States v. International Harvester Co., supra, at 708, 709.
71. It has been argued that since price leadership brings about the same condi-
tions as price fixing, i.e., inflexible markets, continuance in business of high cost
producers, and production not in accord with present demand, it should be con-
demned. HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 41 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941). In order to combat
the evils of price leadership, Handler suggests in this article as a possible remedy
the creation of a flexible administrative agency to investigate industries where price
leadership is prevalent, "to eliminate the causes of conditions favorable to the practice,
and to restore, invigorate, and protect competition in such industries." Such a
program to be carried out successfully would entail an agency with large investiga-
tive, remedial powers because of the variety of factors to be considered in each case.
The government agency might preclude disastrous price wars by its method of
stopping price leadership. However, business which now feels that its hands are
tied too strongly by the strings of agency control would very likely oppose another
extension of bureaucracy into its domain. Although this argument has merit, it is
the public interest which is paramount, and if the stratifying effects of price leader-
ship can only be met by an expert governmental agency, then such regulation should
obtain. Utilization of traditional remedies would appear to be either too drastic or
wholly or partially ineffective. A new approach to the problem is needed. A flexible
agency unconfined by the rigors of judicial process might be the answer.
72. Since price leadership can only be maintained by a relatively large and power-
ful firm, it would appear that it is one of the manifestations of "bigness." Some
authorities have advocated a return to the more classical concepts of competition,
as opposed to oligopolistic competition, by means of judicial surgery. Professor
Eugene V. Rostow has been a leading proponent of such a solution. See, among his
other writings, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY (1948); Monopoly
Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. Rzv. 745 (1949); Entry
Into the Oil Refining Business: Vertical Integration Re-examined, 61 YALE L.J.
856 (1952).
On the other hand it has been pointed out that courts, with so much authority
to the contrary, would probably not now attack "bigness," since divestiture in all
oligopolistic industries would logically follow, and the ensuing decentralization of
power would seriously impair the nation's defense efforts. See, generally, Johnston
and Stevens, Monwpoly or Monwpolisation-A Reply to Professor Rostow, 44 ILL.
L. REv. 269 (1949); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333,
347 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Possibly the court's position with respect to "bigness" might
be modified in the near future. Two pending cases will at any rate give the court
the opportunity: the currently pending duPont case, and United States v. Standard
Oil of California, Civil No. 11584-c, S.D. Cal., May 12, 1950.
73. The Camden-Philadelphia area presents a very interesting situation because
each city is in the "territory" of a different price leader, and a price war in one city
will be felt in the other. (The present tankwagon price in Camden is 14.6 cents plus
tax and in Philadelphia, 14.7 cents plus tax). The fact that the competitive allow-
ances were removed almost simultaneously in both areas, each area having a different
price leader, should at least stir the imagination of some antitrust prosecutor.
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known who supplied the initial spark to bring about this result, no doubt
one of the purposes of the policy decision to cease subsidizing was a desire
to stop further "spoiling of the market." This conscious parallel action 74
on the part of suppliers would seem to fall within the doctrine enunciated
in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,75 in that the competing suppliers
appeared to have accepted an "invitation to participate in a plan, the neces-
sary consequence of which if carried out, [would be] a restraint of inter-
state commerce." 76 This would be sufficient to establish an unlawful con-
spiracy.7 7 However, a holding that such tenuous evidence of conspiracy is
capable of proving conclusively an illegal restraint of trade would be mani-
festly unfair to business interests. Here a standard 78 commodity is being
sold. Composition and processing of gasoline is practically uniform. The
over-all market demand is inelastic and the number of competitors relatively
small. 9 A uniform price is therefore not surprising. Furthermore, from
the very outset, the allowances in the case studied were considered tem-
porary. Because good business reasons 1o may exist in this concert of action
which are compatible with maintaining an "effective" 81 competition, it
would appear that the doctrine of conscious parallelism should be used as
a procedural device which would direct the burden of proof.8 2  The uni-
74. For an analysis of the evolutions of the conscious parallel action doctrine
see Kittelle and Lamb, The Implied Conspiracy Doctrine and Delivered Pricing,
15 LAW & CoNmMp. PRoB. 227 (1950); Note, Conscious Parallelism-Fact or
Fancy?, 3 STAN. L. REV. 679 (1951).
75. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
76. Id. at 227. The doctrine has since found application in a number of privately
prosecuted motion picture distributing cases and also in cases instituted by the
FTC. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 150 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1945),
rev'd on other grounds, 327 U.S. 251; William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's
Inc., 150 F.2d 738 (3d Cir. 1945). In Triangle Conduit Cable Co. v. FTC, 168
F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Clayton Mark and Co. v.
FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949), the doctrine was further extended when proof of use
in the industry of a delivered price method, common knowledge of such use by
competitors, and substantial uniformity of published prices was enough to establish
an unfair method of competition.
77. But cf. Pevely Diary Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 942 (1950) (price uniformity held insufficient to prove con-
spiracy where costs of products standardized and no other evidence).
78. The nationally advertised brands of gasoline have about equal consumer
acceptance, which would indicate that different additives used by the major com-
panies produce no marked difference in the performance of the product.
79. "The number of major oil companies operating in the different states ranges
from 5 to 16, the modal number being 11." Coox, op. cit. supra note 68, at 41.
80. "No parallelism, conscious or unconscious, can overcome a finding of reason-
ableness." Fanchon and Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 84, 104
(S.D. Cal. 1951).
81. In recent years, many authorities have chosen to discuss competition in
terms of effectiveness or workability. See, e.g., Adelman, Effective Competition and
the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. R.v. 1289 (1948) ; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust
Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MicH. L. REv.
1139 (1952) ; Smith, Effective Competition: Hypothesis for Modernizing the Anti-
trust Laws, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 405 (1951).
82. HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 41 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941).
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formity of action should give rise to a prima facie collusive understanding.
It would then be up to the defendant, who has more access to the facts,
to come forward to rebut the presumption of illegality.8 3
If the suppliers in the instant situation cannot carry the burden of
showing that the uniform cessation of subsidy practices was reasonable,
the government is faced with the further problem of what relief to seek.8 4
The damage has been already done. Of course, if the concert of action
applies to future policy an injunction could handle the matter by directing
that the companies not be guided in its subsidy practices by any "agree-
ment" not to subsidize. But at present suppliers are already very reluctant
to grant subsidies. Thus proof of a future agreement to the same effect
would be difficult.
PREVENTION OF PRICE WARS
Limitation of Sign Sizes.-One attempt to mitigate retail price com-
petition in the Philadelphia-Camden area has taken the form of legislation
which limits the size of price signs on the station premises.8 5 The main
promotional weapon of the price-cutter is his large sign announcing his
price to those in its vicinity. It is generally felt in the industry that this
type of legislation has considerably stabilized prices in areas where it has
been enforced1sa But its constitutionality has been contested successfully
in various states.8 6 Its proponents have argued that "circus signs" cause
accidents by distracting the attention of motorists; 87 that large signs lead
83. Handler, Anti-trust-New Frontiers and New Perplexities, 6 RECORD OF
THE AssocIAnoN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY or Nwv YORK 59, 67 (1951). The
shift in the burden of proof would not be inconsistent with antitrust policies as they
have developed in recent years. See, e.g., Providence Fruit and Produce Bldg., Inc.
v. Gamco, Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952), where the court put the burden on
defendant to show the reasonableness of its practice in excluding plaintiff from
facilities of defendant organization.
84. "In any equity suit, the end to be served is not punishment of past trans-
gressions, nor is it merely to end specific illegal practices. A public interest served
by such civil suits is that they effectively pry open to competition a market that has
been closed by defendants' illegal restraints. If this decree accomplishes less than
that, the Government has won a lawsuit and lost a cause." International Salt
Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947). See ScHwARTz, FREE ENTERPRISE AND
EcoN omic ORGANIZATION 519 (1952).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §2611y (Purdon Supp. 1951) prohibits price signs
which are higher or wider than twelve inches. See also the New Jersey statute,
note 15, supra.
85a. These sentiments were recently reiterated when various dealers were asked
to comment on a court ruling declaring sign size statutes unconstitutional. The
Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Feb. 27, 1953, p. 3, col. 3.
86. State v. Hobson, 83 A.2d 846 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Levy v. City of Pontiac,
331 Mich. 100, 49 N.W.2d 80 (1951); State v. Miller, 126 Conn. 373, 12 A.2d 192
(1940) ; Regal Oil Co. v. State, 123 N.J.L. 456, 10 A.2d 495 (1939) ; Commonwealth
v. Vaughn, Pa. Ct. of Quarter Sessions of Beaver County, July 24, 1952; Gambone
v. Commonwealth, Pa. Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Feb. 25, 1953.
Contra: Merit Oil Co. v. Director of Division of Necessaries of Life, 319 Mass. 301,
65 N.E.2d 529 (1946); People v. Arlen Service Station, 284 N.Y. 340, 31 N.E.2d
184 (1940); Mark Robbins v. City of Philadelphia, Pa. C.P. 6, March 1, 1951.
87. ". . . these big signs have a habit of having people drive in and clogging
up the roadway . . ."; ". . . if a motorist is proceeding along the highway and
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to price wars which incite violence among dealers; 88 that dealers are forced
by price wars to cheat the public in order to stay in business; that price
wars lower the morale of the dealers; 89 and that consequent emphasis on
gallonage deprives the public of customary service and courtesy.90 On the
other hand, opponents of the legislation urge that highway accidents are
more likely to occur if a price conscious motorist must slow down in order
to see a small sign; that there is little evidence that price wars have incited
violence among dealers; that breaches of the peace and dealer cheating
should be punished and deterred by existing statutory and common law and
not by an indirect method which stultifies competition; that dealer morale
should not be promoted by depriving the public of the advantage of com-
petitive prices; and that there is nothing to prevent any dealer from offering
services and charging more for gasoline. It would appear that the motive
behind this legislation was to insulate the less efficient, higher cost, and
lower volume dealers from competition. The expense of this protection
ultimately falls on the consuming public which is denied the advantage of
price competition. It is submitted that there is nothing which should render
gasoline dealers any more immune from competition than other merchants.
These statutes appear to be an arbitrary attempt, under the guise of police
regulation, to eliminate competition by forbidding any effective advertise-
ment of prices.91
Prohibition of Self-Service Stations.-Another attempt to lessen com-
petition among retail dealers of gasoline has taken the form of a New Jersey
statute prohibiting the operation of gasoline stations on the self-service
principle.9 2 In upholding this statute, the New Jersey Supreme Court
noted that the professed legislative purpose is that of protecting the public
against an increase in fire hazard attending this form of gasoline distribu-
sees this rather large sign . . . he is apt to take his eyes off the road . . . and
create traffic problems. . . ." Transcript of Record, pp. 22 and 25, Mark Robbins
v. City of Philadelphia, Pa. C.P. 6, March 1, 1951.
88. "Gradually that condition grows worse . . .until it gets into a gigantic
gas war, when dealers all over . . . who wanted to stay in business . . .had to
sit in their . . . stations with shot guns on their laps in order to protect them-
selves from violence. . . ." Id. at 47.
89. ". . . it puts the retail gasoline business on a rather low plane, where men
can advertise like that. . . . It sort of broke the industry down to a grease ball
business instead of . . . a businessman's business." Id. at 32.
90. "On the other hand, you have [those] who want to have . . . a couple
of . . .pumps . . . out front, with the chair not too far away where they can
go out, pick it up, squirt it in, put the money in their pocket, and go back and sit
in the chair." Id. at 65.
91. See note 86 supra. Cf. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929)
(the Court held there could be no price regulation of gasoline because it is not
"affected with a public interest"); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504
(1923) (the Court said that it is beyond the power of a state, under the guise of
protecting the public, to impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon
bakers).
92. NJ. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, c. 3a, § 1 (Supp. 1952) : "It shall be unlawful for
an owner . . . of any retail . . . service station . . . to permit any . . . cus-
tomer . . . to use or manipulate any pump . . . or other device for . . . dis-
pensing gasoline . . . for the purpose of filling the tank of a motor vehicle. . ...
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tion.9" But, in California, where such stations are widespread, both casualty
and fire insurance companies maintain the same or even lower rates for
supervised self-service stations as for conventional stations. 4 Stripped of
its purported public safety purposes, it would seem that such a statute is
merely another device to mitigate price competition at the retail level of the
industry.95
Resale Price Maintenance.-An exception to the general prohibition
against price fixing agreements is contained in the state fair trade laws.
These laws authorize manufacturers, producers or distributors to enter
into contracts with wholesalers or retailers for the purpose of fixing mini-
mum prices for the resale of branded goods in intrastate commerce.96 All
contain provisions that non-signers, having knowledge of the existence of
such contracts, are bound to the same extent as the contracting parties.
The Miller-Tydings amendment to the Sherman Act validated for the pur-
poses of interstate commerce all "contracts and agreements" entered into
pursuant to state fair trade acts.97 In 1951, the Supreme Court held that
this amendment did not validate the non-signer provisions of these stat-
utes.9 s A strong desire to avoid any practice which has the semblance of an
anti-trust violation has led the major suppliers in the past to shun the use
of this means of resale price maintenance. In addition, some retail dealers
display a surprising reluctance to having their prices dictated in this fashion.
Therefore, this. method of softening competition has had little significance
in the gasoline industry. A recent amendment to the Federal Fair Trade
Law, however, sanctions for the purpose of interstate commerce the non-
signer provisions of the state fair trade laws. 9 This could be a powerful
weapon in the hands of the major refiners. But the interests of the gasoline
consumer would be better served if it were not used, since, by eliminating
price competition among dealers with different levels of costs, it prevents
price reductions which could and should be made. Legislation recognizing
fair trade prices is an invitation to maintain the status quo. Such price
fixing rewards a minority group by sacrificing the interest of the majority.
10 0
Minimum Dealers Margins.-Unfair sales laws have been enacted in
thirty-eight states. Like the resale price maintenance statutes they have
93. Reingold v. Harper, 6 N.J. 182, 192, 78 A.2d 54, 59 (1951).
94. 99 U. OF PA. L. RFv. 1016, 1017 (1951).
95. "Price control through the legislative process has long had favor among
the operators of gasoline filling stations. . . . The law before us had such sponsor-
ship . . . although the advocacy was professed to be grounded in considerations
of safety related to the hazards of explosion and fire." Reingold v. Harper, 6 N.J.
182, 192, 78 A.2d 54, 59 (1951). For a discussion of the constitutionality of the
New Jersey Statute, see 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1016 (1951).
96. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 7 (Purdon Supp. 1951).
97. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), .15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1951).
98. Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
99. See Pub. L. No. 542, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a) (1) et seq. (July 14, 1952).
100. In Liquor Store Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla.
1949), the court held a fair trade statute to be unconstitutional on the ground that
it served a private rather than a public purpose.
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been enacted for the declared purpose of preventing abuses of price com-
petition.0 1 But, unlike the fair trade laws, they do not depend for their
effectiveness upon the initiative of distributors who, under the fair trade
laws, must first set the resale prices for their products. In general, unfair
sales laws declare sales of merchandise by wholesalers and retailers at prices
less than "cost" to be unlawful when made with intent to injure com-
petitors or to destroy competition. 0 2 The difficulties inherent in defining
and ascertaining "cost", however, have greatly diminished the effectiveness
of this legislation. 03 Accountants themselves differ widely as to proper
methods of assigning general expenses to particular products and periods,
and computing other elements of "cost". 104 Problems may even arise in
determining the invoice cost for a particular sale. Especially during a price
war, when his supplier's price has varied with the competition, the invoice
cost to the dealer of a gallon of gasoline is extremely difficult to ascertain.
In addition, an exception is contained in many of the acts exempting sales
made in good faith to meet competition. While this does not protect an
initial price-cutter, this exception withdraws those who follow from the
prohibition of these acts.10 5 Moreover, these laws leave untouched the low
cost non-branded, and efficient branded, dealers who are primarily respon-
sible for the initiation of price wars. The granting of temporary price
reductions by suppliers then permits higher cost retailers to engage in a
price war without selling below "cost." I08 For these reasons, this type
of legislation has had no apparent effect in mitigating price competition at
the level of the gasoline retail dealer.
It has been suggested that legislation directed to the fixing of minimum
dealer's margins by a state agency or private cost surveys be enacted.
0 7
This contemplates amendments to the present unfair sales laws which would
redefine "cost" to include invoice price plus a minimum percentage margin.
Such legislation is dearly opposed to the interest of the public in lower
prices. In addition to being subject to the infirmities of the existing unfair
sales laws, it would harm those dealers who, believing that they can do
business more efficiently than their competitors, choose to pass the savings
along to their customers.
101. See Rodgers, Unfair Sales Laws, 38 A.B.A.J. 921, 922 (1952).
102. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §213 (Purdon Supp. 1951).
103. See COVER, GOVERNMENT REGULATION AS A FACTOR IN BuSINESS MORTALITY
139, 149 (TNEC Monograph 17, 1941).
104. See Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 391, 395 (1948).
105. But often one who relies on this excuse for price reductions must take the
risk that his competitor's prices are themselves in violation of law. See Comment,
57 YALE L.J. 391, 415 (1948).
106. An example of how the enforcement of these statutes may run afoul of the
Sherman Act is provided by United States v. Conn. Food Council, Civil No. 680,
D. Conn., Nov. 5, 1941. The Connecticut statute required a fixed mark-up unless
the seller proved a lower cost. The decree dissolved the Council and enjoined it
from threatening litigation, suggesting minimum prices, and computing "an average
. . cost of doing business . . . or establishing standards or methods for such
computation."
107. REPORT OF THE GovERNoR's COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE TnE GAsoLNE PRICE
WAR 3 (Conn. 1950).
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Agency Control.-Some dealers have suggested, as an alternative to
what they consider "destructive competition", the creation of a public
agency with authority to control all aspects of the retail level of the in-
dustry-including entry, the setting of retail prices, and the determination
of permissible methods of advertising. But, in addition tor being subject to
the same objectionable features as the aforementioned statutes, such an
agency would probably be condemned by the courts on the authority of
Williams v. Standard Oil,1 0 8 where an agency of much more limited power
was struck down by the Supreme Court. The Court held that the ultimate
purpose of the agency was to control the retail price of gasoline, which
could not be done since the selling of gasoline is not a business affected with
the "public interest." 109
CONCLUSION
The retail dealers of gasoline are in an unenviable economic position.
They have been marketing a product at prices which, even before the recent
price wars, had risen much less than the prices of comparable commodi-
ties."x0 Many of them, despairing of unrestricted competition, have turned
to the legislatures for protection. However, such an approach appears
undesirable for the following reasons:
1. Statutes proscribing below-cost sales present a multitude of
enforcement problems and become ineffective when the industry en-
gages in subsidy practices.
2. Any legislation fixing retail margins of gasoline by public
agencies or private cost surveys would tend to interfere with the cor-
rectives of free competition.
3. Legislation allowing resale price maintenance deprives the
efficient retailers of the opportunity to pass cost savings on to con-
sumers.
4. Legislation regulating the maximum size of signs displayed
at service stations and prohibiting the operation of self-service stations
deprives the public of the advantage of price competition in the sale of
gasoline. In addition, the constitutionality of such statutes is question-
able because their main purpose is price maintenance.
5. A commission set up to regulate trade practices in gasoline re-
tailing with special reference to price wars suffers from the same
infirmities as any direct legislation in-this area. State fair trade agen-
cies and criminal statutes can be utilized to deter fraudulent practices.
The public benefits through lower prices. Vigorous price competition
helps to eliminate the inefficient retailer, puts increased pressure on sup-
108. 278 U.S. 235 (1929).
109. Accord, New State Ice C6. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (ice); State
v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940) (dry cleaning). But cf. Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (milk).
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